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Conflict of Laws-CHOICE OF LAW-GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST 
TEST APPLIED TO HOLD FOREIGN TAVERN OWNER LIABLE UNDER 
LOCAL AW-Bernhard u. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,546 P.2d 
719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976). 
Harrah's Club, a well known Nevada gambling and drinking 
club, regularly advertises in California. In July 1971, Fern and 
Phillip Myers responded to the Club's advertisements and drove 
from their California home to Harrah's Club in Nevada. Although 
the Myers became obviously intoxicated while at the club, club 
employees continued to serve them alcoholic beverages. The 
Myers left the club and drove from Nevada into California, where 
their car, driven by a highly intoxicated Fern Myers, crossed the 
center line and collided head-on with motorcyclist Richard Bern- 
hard. 
Bernhard, also a California resident, brought an action 
against Harrah's Club in California superior court. He alleged 
that Harrah's Club had negligently furnished alcoholic beverages 
to the Myers and that under California law the club was civilly 
liable for injuries caused in his accident with the Myers. Harrah's 
Club filed a general demurrer, claiming that Nevada law, which 
denies recovery against a tavernkeeper for damages caused by his 
intoxicated patrons, should govern. The trial court sustained the 
demurrer. The California Supreme Court, having previously re- 
jected the traditional torts conflict rule of lex loci delicti in favor 
of the governmental interest approach, analyzed the California 
and Nevada state interests and concluded that since California's 
interest would be more impaired by the nonapplication of Califor- 
nia law, California law should app1y.l 
A. The Restatement and Lex Loci Delicti 
Until recently, the rule universally applied to torts conflicts 
was that of lex loci delicti-the law of the place of the wrong 
governed. This simple rule was embodied in the first Restatement 
of Conflicts2 and reflected the Restatement's overall concern with 
certainty, predictability of result, and ease of administration. 
1. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. 
denied, 97 S .  Ct. 159 (1976). The court of appeals also applied California law, although 
on different reasoning. Bernhard v. Myers, 117 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974). Interestingly, the 
court in the instant case did not mention the lower appeal. 
2. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $ 4  377-83 (1934). 
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Strict application of the rule, however, often resulted in inequita- 
ble and unjust  result^.^ In order to apply some law other than that 
indicated by strict operation of the rule, innovative courts re- 
sorted to various subterfuges: classifying the issue as procedural 
rather than s~bstantive;~ characterizing the matter as contract 
rather than tort;5 resorting to r e n v ~ i ; ~  or arbitrarily relying on 
public policy.' 
The rule and the Restatement were generally denounced by 
 commentator^,^ who not only criticized the judicial gymnastics 
required to avoid literal application of the ruleg but also pointed 
out that a mechanical application of the rule generally ignored 
the special facts of the case, the contents and purposes of the 
conflicting laws, lo and the relevant state interests." 
The courts, sensitive to the criticisms and aware of the in- 
equitable results of lex loci delicti, began to abandon the rule in 
favor of less rigid approaches. l2 This transition, however, has been 
3. An oft-cited example is the case of Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956), which involved an accident in Arabia between 
a United States citizen and a truck owned by a United States corporation. The federal 
district court in New York applied New York's conflicts rule, or lex loci delicti, and 
directed a verdict for defendant, since plaintiff had failed to present evidence of the 
applicable Saudi Arabian law. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 
4. The court was free to apply its own procedural law. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 8 585 (1934); see, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 862, 264 P.2d 944, 946 
(1953). But see Allen v. Nessler, 247 Minn. 230, 240-43, 76 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (1956). 
5. Since under the Restatement the court was to apply the law of the place of con- 
tracting, courts, by treating the issue as contractual rather than tortious, could sometimes 
change the substantive law that should apply. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto 
Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928). 
6. Renvoi is a doctrine under which the court adopts the law of a foreign jurisdiction, 
including the law of conflicts of law, which in turn refers the court back to the law of its 
own forum. See, e.g., University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936). 
7. See, e.g., Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 P. 374 (1927). 
8. E.g., W. COOK, T H E  LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); 
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933). 
9. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 655, 670 n.35 
( 1959). 
10. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 9 (1965); see also Cavers, supra note 8, 
a t  192. 
11. Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of 
Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958). 
12. In the following cases, the courts have either expressly rejected the lex loci delicti 
rule or have impliedly rejected it by rejecting the Restatement approach in another area: 
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 
447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,432 P.2d 727,63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); 
First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437,514 P.2d 314 (1973); Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, 
92 Idaho 718,449 P.2d 378 (1968); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57,213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); 
W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570,63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 
Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Jagers v. 
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difficult and has led to confusion.13 Although the commentators 
were united in their dislike for the rule and the Restatement, they 
invariably disagreed on a more satisfactory alternative. As a re- 
sult, the courts have adopted a variety of approaches, drawing 
support from the various modern theories as needed.14 
In order to understand current torts conflicts law, one must 
have some understanding of the alternatives that are presented 
to a court when dealing with a conflicts question. The following 
section gives a brief description of the more prominent modern 
theories. Inasmuch as the suggestions of most commentators 
embrace a general approach to all areas of conflicts law, the fol- 
lowing discussion will first describe the overall approach and then 
comment more specifically on its tort application. 
B. Modern Alternatives to the Restatement 
1. The Restatement (Second) 
The most widely adopted alternative approach15 is that con- 
Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d 610 (Me. 
1970); In re Air Crash Disaster, 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975); Schneider v. Nichols, 
280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); 
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969); Hanley v. Tribune Publishing Co., 527 
F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1975) (Nevada); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351,222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk 
v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 
N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); 
Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St. 2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 
403 U.S. 931 (1971); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson 
Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 
Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, petition for 
cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 127 Vt. 229,245 A.2d 
891 (1968) (contract case); Potlatch No. 1 Fed. Credit Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wash. 2d 
806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969) (contract case); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 
(1965). The lex loci delicti rule has been followed in some recent cases, e.g., Landers v. 
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 58 Del. 488, 211 A.2d 594 
(1965). 
13. For a review of the development of the law in various states, see Leflar, The 
"New" Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 457 (1972). 
14. Leflar's analysis of the Wisconsin cases illustrates the pattern: Buckeye v. Buck- 
eye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931) (lex loci delicti); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (characterization of the doctrine of intrafamily 
immunity as a family law problem governed by the law of the domicile); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 
26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) (combination of "most significant relationship," 
"center of gravity,'' and "governmental interest" theories); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 
578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967) (adoption of Leflar's "choice-influencing considerations"). 
Leflar, supra note 13, a t  465-67. For a review and comparison of the different approaches, 
see von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL . REV. 927 
(1975); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: 
The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1975). 
15. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF C O N ~ I C T  OF LAWS, app. $$  145-85 
(1971). 
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tained in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. The most 
significant aspect of this alternative is that it greatly increases 
the range of policies to be considered when dealing with a con- 
flicts issue. Whereas the first Restatement was overly preoccu- 
pied with ease of administration, certainty, and uniformity, sec- 
tion 6 of the Restatement (Second) adds other broad considera- 
tions, such as the needs of the interstate and international sys- 
tems, the relevant policies of the forum and other interested 
states, and the protection of the parties' justified expectations.18 
Based upon these broad policies, more specific rules are for- 
mulated in each area of the law. The rule to be applied in torts 
conflicts issues is that the "rights and liabilities of the parties 
. . . are determined by the . . . law of the state which, with 
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence."17 The Restatement (Second) also offers rules that 
apply to specific torts, e.g., tort actions based on injuries to per- 
son, land or other tangibles usually are to be governed by the law 
of the state where the injury occurred.18 
The Restatement (Second) is the most versatile of the var- 
ious methods of conflict resolution. For example, a court dealing 
with a torts conflicts issue is free to base its decision upon the 
broad policies outlined in section 6, the narrow "most significant 
relationship" test, or even narrower rules that deal with specific 
torts. This flexibility has been both applaudedl@and criticized. 
The most common criticism of the broad approach is that it af- 
fords "no real basis for decision in the hard cases because it does 
not identify the considerations which control the flexibility that 
16. Restatement (Second) 8 6 suggests that, absent statutory authority, a court 
should consider the following factors as being relevant to the choice of applicable law: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests 
of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
17. Id. 9 145. In making this determination, the following contacts are to be taken 
into account: the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct occurred; 
the domicile of the parties; and the place where the relationship, if any, between the 
parties is centered. Id. 
18. Id. $ 9  146-49, 151-52, 154-55. 
19. "[Tlhe Restatement (Second) is the most workable and useful single tool . . . 
currently available to the bench and the bar. It is comprehensive, flexible, and eclectic." 
Westbrook, supra note 14, a t  463. 
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it allows . . . ."m The more specific torts rules have been con- 
demned as throwbacks to the original Restatement's preoccupa- 
tion with the place of the injury as the determining factor.21 
2. Leflar and the choice-influencing considerations 
The broad policies outlined in Restatement (Second) section 
6 provide the basis for the "choice-influencing considerations" 
proposed by Professor Robert Leflar.22 Leflar's thesis is that 
courts can use the actual policies as a "practical (though not a 
mechanical) test of the rightness of choice-of-law rules and deci- 
s i o n ~ . " ~ ~  He maintains, however, that the many policies involvedU 
must be reduced to a manageable number, with a minimum of 
overlap. Accordingly, he has summarized the policies relevant to 
conflicts laws into five "choice-influencing  consideration^":^^ (1) 
predictability of results,26 (2) maintenance of interstate and inter- 
national order,27 (3) simplification of the judicial task," (4) ad- 
vancement of the forum's governmental  interest^,^^ and (5) appli- 
20. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 8 96 at  222 (1968). 
21. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 L. & CONTEMP. ROB. 700,704 (1963); 
D. CAVERS, supra note 10, a t  72. 
22. Leflcr, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 
( 1966). 
23. Id. at  281. 
24. The Restatement (Second) lists seven policies to be considered-see note 16 
supra. Professor Yntema has identified 17 policies which he says are relevant in the choice- 
of-law process. Yntema, The Objective of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. REV. 721, 
734-35 (1957). 
25. The choice-influencing considerations are discussed in R. LEFLAR, supra note 20, 
at §§  101-11; Leflar, supra note 22; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing 
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966) (gives hypothetical applications). 
26. This consideration embraces the policy encouraging uniformity of result and the 
policy that the parties to a transaction should be able to predict beforehand the legal 
consequences of their actions. See Leflar, supra note 22, a t  282-83. 
27. The problems arising from the unique system of federalism within the United 
States, as well as the conflicts that arise between nations, are weighed in this factor. It  
includes a consideration of the limitations upon state action that are imposed by the 
federal constitution and also recognizes the possible interests of states other than the 
forum in having their law applied. See id. a t  285-87. 
28. Although this is classified as a minor consideration, Leflar maintains that com- 
plex rules that are difficult to administer delay decisions and lead to overcrowded dockets. 
Therefore, other considerations being equal, a court should give preference to the law that 
is simplest to apply. However, this does not justify an automatic preference for forum law, 
nor should mechanical rules such as lex loci delicti be applied, since both ignore other 
important policies. See id. at  288-90. 
29. This consideration recognizes the interest of the forum state in advancing its own 
policies when proper. This is no justification for unreasoned preference of forum law, and 
the burden is placed on the court to identify the pertinent policies by "thoughtful and 
intelligent analysis of the legal materials in the light of current socio-economic, cultural, 
and political attitudes in the community." Id. at  290-95. 
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cation of the better rule of law.30 
Criticism of Leflar's approach has generally been directed 
toward the "better rule of law" consideration and has pointed out 
that if a court applies a foreign law as better than its own, it is 
either usurping the role of its own state legislature or avoiding its 
responsibility to overrule and update its own law. On the other 
hand, application of a forum's own law as "better" has been 
criticized as presumptuous and offensive to the other state.31 
Despite these criticisms, several jurisdictions have adopted 
Leflar's approachS2 and have relied expressly on the "better rule 
of law" consideration in their decisions. In torts cases, the deci- 
sions have been based primarily on the courts' analyses of the 
"better rule of law" and "governmental interest" considerations, 
while the other three factors have been dismissed as irrelevant or 
unimportant .33 
3. Cavers and principled preferences 
Professor David Cavers has voiced his concern that formulas 
such as Leflar's are too complex and of no precedential value. 
Accordingly, he has advocated the development of what he terms 
"principles of preferen~e,"~~ which are in essence rules that would 
apply to all cases having the same general fact pattern. 
Generally, the principles of preference apply the law impos- 
ing the higher standard of conduct, providing it is not unjust to 
the defendant. For example, Principle 1 deals with the situation 
where the law of the state of injury provides a higher standard of 
conduct than the law of the state where the defendant acted or 
has his home, and mandates the application of the law of the 
state of injury. Similarly, if the law of the state where the defen- 
dant acted imposes a higher standard of conduct than the law of 
the state of injury, Principle 3 indicates that the higher standard 
should apply, as long as the injury was foreseeable to the defen- 
30. Although his inclusion of this consideration has been highly criticized, Leflar 
defends it on the ground that courts do consider it. Its inclusion provides a means for 
courts to reject "anachronistic laws still hanging on" in their own or other states without 
having to "cover up" their choice with other superficial reasons. See id. a t  295-304. 
31. Westbrook, supra note 14, a t  461-62. 
32. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Clark v. Clark, 107 
N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967). 
33. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 170, 203 N.W.2d 408, 416-17 (1973); Clark v. 
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355-56, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (1966); Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 
599-602, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674-75 (1967). 
34. See D. CAVERS, supra note 10, a t  121-22 & n.8. 
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dant. However, in the instance where the law of the state of injury 
and defendant's conduct imposes a lower standard than that of 
the home state of the plaintiff, Principle 2 indicates that the 
defendant's expectations should be protected and the law of the 
state of action and injury, even though imposing a lower standard 
of conduct, should apply.35 
Although none of Cavers' principles have been expressly 
adopted by any jurisdiction, they have been used as forceful argu- 
ments when appl i~able .~~  
4. Ehrenzweig and lex fori 
In contrast to Leflar and Cavers, both of whom criticize any 
overt preference for forum law,37 Professor Albert Ehrenzweig has 
attempted to show by logical argument and historical analysis 
that the forum should begin with the presumption that it will 
apply its own law (lex fori), except in certain situations where 
rules have developed that dictate the application of foreign law.38 
Examples of these rules include a "rule of validation" in reference 
to contracts, trusts, and wills, which generally seeks to uphold the 
validity of such  agreement^,^^ and the situs rules that generally 
govern in property cases .40 
In torts, Ehrenzweig advocates the general application of lex 
fori, except where either party would be dealt with unfairly. Eh- 
renzweig divides these latter cases into two categories: those in 
which the primary purpose of the law is the censure and admoni- 
tion of the ~ r o n g d o e r , ~ ~  and those in which the law seeks primar- 
ily to compensate for harm inflicted by unavoidable accidents 
(enterprise liabilit~).'~ As to the admonitory torts, Ehrenzweig 
35. Id. at 139-66. 
36. The appellate court in the instant case relied upon Principle 1 as a partial justifi- 
cation for its decision to apply California law. Bernhard v. Myers, 117 Cal. Rptr. 351, 356 
(1974). 
37. D. CAVERS, supra note 10, a t  120; Cavers, Some of Ehrenzweig's Choice-of-Law 
Generalizations, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (1965); Leflar, supra note 22, at 291. 
38. For a summary of Ehrenzweig's views, see W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 525-26 (6th ed. 1971). 
39. Id. See also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS $ 4  175-84 
(1962). 
40. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 
637, 643 (1960); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 39, §§  232-34. 
41. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Laui and 
Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1951). 
42. See id.;  Ehrenzweig, Vicarious Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Touard a 
Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 111, 69 YALE L.J. 
978 ( 1960). 
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would apply the law of the state of conduct.43 In cases of enter- 
prise liability, Ehrenzweig would apply any law that is reasonably 
"foreseeable and insurable" by the defendant.44 In instances in 
which a defendant finds himself in a state whose laws were not 
foreseeable, Ehrenzweig would recommend dismissal under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 45 Thus, the plaintiff must 
choose a forum whose laws were foreseeable and calculable by the 
defendant. 
Although his views are often ~ited,~"hrenzweig's lex fori 
doctrine has not been explicitly adopted by any juri~diction.~' 
Ehrenzweig maintains, however, that courts have implicitly ap- 
plied these principles," except where the judges were not imagi- 
native enough to escape from black letter rules such as those of 
the Restatement. 
5. Currie and governmental interest analysis 
The instant case applied the approach advocated by the late 
Professor Brainerd Currie. Like Ehrenzweig's theory, Professor 
Currie's "governmental interest" theory expresses a strong prefer- 
ence for the application of forum law," a position based on Cur- 
rie's firmly held belief that the forum state with an interest in the 
case should (in most instances) apply its own law.50 
43. Ehrenzweig, supra note 41, a t  5-6. 
44. Ehrenzweig, supra note 42, a t  978. 
45. See Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of 
Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 11, 69 YALE L. J .  794, 801 
(1960); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enter- 
prise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": I, 69 YALE L. J .  595, 603 (1960). 
46. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y .2d 473,484,191 N .E.2d 279,285, 240 N .Y .S.2d 
743, 751 (1963); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155,166-68, 203 N.W.2d 408,414-15 (1973). 
Often Ehrenzweig would disagree with either the method used to resolve the case or with 
the result. One author has summarized the situation in the following manner: "One way 
to sum up the citation situation would be by saying that the courts have taken about the 
same liberties in citing Ehrenzweig's writing that he sometimes takes in citing their 
cases." Leflar, Ehrenzweig and the Courts, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 366, 371 (1965) (containing 
a good summary of Ehrenzweig's influence on the judiciary). 
47. Leflar has examined eight recent conflicts cases and concluded that none of them 
have adopted Ehrenzweig's approach, although he is sometimes cited. Leflar, supra note 
46, a t  369-71. 
48. Ehrenzweig, supra note 40, a t  643-44. At least one other commentator, Professor 
Currie, does not agree with Ehrenzweig's interpretation of the cases. See Currie, 
Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the "Rule of Validation", 18 OKLA. 
L. REV. 243 (1965). 
49. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 
171, 177-78 (1959). 
5G. Currie has stated that: 
[Wlhen the court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign law applicable, 
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The governmental interest method involves essentially a 
four-step pro~ess~~-policy analysis, false conflict analysis, con- 
flict avoidance, and forum law application. The policy analysis 
step requires the court to determine and analyze the policies un- 
derlying the conflicting laws of the forum and the foreign state." 
The most common criticism of the policy analysis step empha- 
sizes the difficulty of ascertaining the policies underlying the 
laws, particularly when the forum court examines foreign law. A 
related criticism is that the forum court may not be capable of 
determining the strength of the policy held by the other state." 
Under the false conflict step, the court determines whether 
or not either state has an interest in applying its policy. If only 
one state has such an interest, the court simply applies the law 
of the interested ~tate.~"his portion of the approach has been 
termed the "clearest contribution of governmental-interest anal- 
y ~ i s . " ~ ~  The correct application of this principle disposes of many 
apparent conflicts, and it has found wide acceptance among 
courts and  commentator^.^^ However, some commentators have 
expressed concern that a court, by failing to identify the state 
policies and interests involved, will erroneously conclude that 
there is no conflict.57 
The conflict avoidance step requires the court to take a closer 
look at an apparent conflict. If a moderate or restrained interpre- 
tation of the policy or interest of one of the states will avoid a 
conflict, the other state's law should be applied.58 Currie cites as 
an example of this step the California case of Bernkrant v. 
it is assuming a great deal: i t  is holding the policy, or interest, of its own state 
inferior and preferring the policy or interest of the foreign state. . . . [Tlhe 
task is not one to be performed by a court. . . . This is a job for a legislative 
committee . . . . 
Id. a t  176-77. 
51. For a summary of Currie's views, see W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 38, 
a t  523-24. 
52. Id. at 523. 
53. For these and other criticisms, see Reese, Recent Developments in Torts Choice- 
of-Law Thinking in the United States, 8 COLUM. J .  TRANSNAT'L L. 181,186-87 (1969); Hill, 
Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U .  CHI. 
L. REV. 463 (1960). 
54. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 38, at 523. 
55. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 L. & CONTEMP. ROB. 754, 756 (1963). 
56. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 9, at 667-81; D. CAVERS, SUPM note 10, at 89; 
Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (uses 
false conflict concept even though applying most significant relationship test). 
57. E.g., Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-a Restatement, 21 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719, 743 (1974). 
58. W. REESE & M.  SENB BERG, supra note 38, at 523. 
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Fowler,59 in which the court declined to apply the California Stat- 
ute of Frauds, which would have invalidated a claim against an 
estate based on an oral contract. Nevada, the place of contracting 
and domicile of the plaintiffs, had no such law. In that case, 
Justice Traynor correctly reasoned (according to Currie) that a 
broad application of California's statute was unnecessary to effec- 
tuate the legislative policy and, by a moderate and restrained 
interpretation of the California statute, avoided conflict with 
Nevada law and 
Under the fourth step, if the court is unable to avoid a con- 
flict between the legitimate interests of the two states, it should 
apply its own forum's law." Currie's conclusion that in a true 
conflict the court should apply the law of the forum has drawn 
heavy criticism from most  commentator^.^^ Even some who basi- 
cally agree with the rest of his approach have offered their own 
suggestions on how to deal with this situation. 
One such solution has been proposed by Professor William 
Baxteqs3 who suggests that  a court that faces a true conflict 
should examine each state's interest and determine to what ex- 
tent the purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by the appli- 
cation or impaired by the nonapplication of the rule. The court 
should apply the law of the state whose policy would be most 
impaired by the nonapplication of the law-a concept Baxter 
labels the "comparative impairment" principle. Baxter admits 
that in some cases the contending interests will appear to be in 
balance, whereupon he says that "[tlhe judge decides on the 
basis of some marginal factor and justifies his decision as best he 
can in his opinion."64 
Professor Harold H o r o w i t ~ , ~ ~  while accepting Baxter's com- 
parative impairment analysis, has suggested additional factors 
the court should consider when faced with a difficult decision. He 
recommends that the court consider "applicable multistate poli- 
c i e ~ " ~ ~  such as the "rule of validation" proposed by Ehrenz~eig,~' 
59. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). 
60. Currie, supra note 55, at 757-58. 
61. W. REESE & M.  SENB BERG, supra note 38, at 524. 
62. E.g., R. LEFLAR, supra note 20, at 224-25; Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal 
System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1963); Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and 
"True Rules", 49 CALIF. L. REV. 240, 246-48 (1961). 
63. Baxter, supra note 62. 
64. Id. at 9. 
65. Horowitz, supra note 57. 
66. Id. at 758-76. 
67. Id. at 759. See text accompanying note 39 supra. 
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and other policies which facilitate and uphold interstate transac- 
tions. In addition, he suggests that the court examine the 
"relevant interests of the parties,"" thus bringing into considera- 
tion the parties' expectations and attempting to avoid unfair sur- 
prise. 
In summary, the application of traditional interest analysis 
as outlined by Professor Currie would place a conflicts case into 
one of the following categorie~:~~ (1) a false conflict case-only one 
state has an interest and its law will be applied;" (2) an avoidable 
conflict case-both states have legitimate interests, but the con- 
flict is resolved by a moderate definition of the policy or interest 
of one state or the other; and (3) an unavoidable conflict 
case-the legitimate interests of the states cannot be reconciled, 
and therefore forum law should be applied. 
The comparative impairment refinement of Professor Cur- 
rie's approach would eliminate the third category and expand the 
second category to include all cases except those in which the 
policies and interests are balanced, whereupon other factors 
would be considered in making the decision. 
Several courts have issued opinions which refer to "govern- 
mental intere~t."~' As indicated earlier, both the Restatement 
(Second) and Leflar's choice-influencing considerations include 
analysis of governmental interests as a factor to be considered 
in resolving a conflicts issue. Therefore, a court that speaks of 
governmental interest may not necessarily belong to Currie's 
camp. California, however, has adopted the Currie approach. 
The following section briefly traces the development of California 
conflicts law up to the instant case. 
- 
68. Horowitz, supra note 57, a t  776-79. It  is possible that Professor Currie's 
"moderate and restrained interpretation" step would encompass the above theories-the 
court in the instant case apparently equated "comparative impairmentw with "a moderate 
and restrained interpretation." See 16 Cal. 3d a t  319-23,546 P.2d at  722-26, 128 Cal. Rptr. 
a t  218-22. 
However, few would agree with Currie that forum law should be applied as a last 
resort. Thus Currie's approach is sometimes termed "traditional" governmental interest, 
when compared to the other solutions which have been suggested. See Sedler, 
Symposium-Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 a x .  
L. REV. 224 (1971). 
69. See Currie, supra note 55, at 763. 
70. Other authors have identified additional false conflicts such as the instances in 
which the laws of both states are the same, or would produce the same result. See Com- 
ment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1967). 
71. See, e.g., cases cited in note 32 supra. 
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C. Previous California Conflicts Cases 
Prior to 1967, lex loci delicti was applied in Cal i f~rn ia .~~  Cali- 
fornia's break from the rule was foreshadowed in the 1963 case of 
Bernkrant v.  Fowler, 73 in which the California Supreme Court 
relied on an analysis of the state interests involved and the expec- 
tations of the parties. Even though the court did not employ the 
governmental interest approach, Currie applauded Bernkrant 
as a model case wherein conflict was avoided by a moderate and 
restrained interpretation of California Law.74 
People v .  One 1953 Ford Vi~toria, '~ which could also be clas- 
sified as a conflict avoidance case, involved the application of a 
California statute that required that the mortgagee of an automo- 
bile forfeit his interest if the car were later used to transport 
narcotics, unless he had made an investigation of the character 
of the purchaser at the time of sale. The sale in question was 
made in Texas, where there was no such requirement. The court 
in the instant case cited People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria as an 
example of a successful application of the comparative impair- 
ment prin~iple.'~ As interpreted by the Bernhard court, the deci- 
sion not to apply the California statute was the result of a 
conclusion that California's interest in controlling the transporta- 
tion of narcotics would be less impaired by the nonapplication of 
the California law than would Texas' interest in protecting valid 
security interests if Texas law were not applied. Currie described 
the case as a "fine illustration of how a court may, by defining 
local interests with moderation and restraint, avoid conflict with 
the interests of another state."'' 
Although foreshadowed by these cases, California did not 
expressly reject the lex loci delicti rule until the 1967 case of Reich 
v. P u r ~ e l l . ~ ~  Reich involved an automobile accident in Missouri 
between the Reichs, Ohio residents en route to California, and 
Purcell, a California resident. The accident caused the death of 
Mrs. Reich and her son. The laws of Missouri limited damages 
72. E.g., Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932). The rule was rejected 
in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See text 
accompanying notes 78-84 infra. 
73. 55 Cal. 2d 588,360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); see text accompanying note 
59 supra. 
74. Currie, supra note 55, at 757. 
75. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). 
76. 16 Cal. 3d at 321-22, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220. 
77. Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719,749 (1961). 
78. 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). 
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to $25,000, while California and Ohio had no limitation. In the 
resultant action by Mr. Reich, the trial court entered a judgment 
for $25,000. The California Supreme Court reversed, first reject- 
ing the place-of-the-wrong ruleT9 and then proceeding to analyze 
the case from the standpoint of governmental interest. 
Following the formula espoused by Professor Currie, the 
court first identified the "involved statesV8O as California (forum 
state and domicile of the defendant), Ohio (domicile of the plain- 
tiffs and decedents at the time of the accident), and Missouri 
(place of the injury). Each state's law was ascertained, and the 
court examined the interest of the three states in the case. As for 
its own law, the court concluded that since California had no 
limitations on damages, it had no interest in protecting the defen- 
dant. The fact that the plaintiffs had moved to California follow- 
ing the accident was considered irrelevant, and California was 
classified as a disinterested forum. Missouri was said to have the 
predominant interest as to the regulation of conduct within its 
borders, but the court classified the limitation on damages not as 
an issue of conduct, but as an issue of compensation. The court 
explained that Missouri would have no substantial interest in 
applying its laws governing compensation since none of the par- 
ties resided there. Having concluded that neither California nor 
Missouri had an interest in the case, the court noted that the 
defendant himself could not complain "when compensatory dam- 
ages are assessed in accordance with the law of his d~mic i l e , "~~  
and applied Ohio law. Although the court did not so identify the 
case as such in the opinion, it was later classified as a false con- 
f l i ~ t . ~ ~  
Hurtado v. Superior Court,83 also a false conflict case, in- 
volved a wrongful death action brought by the survivors of a 
Mexican citizen killed in an accident in California. The defen- 
dant was a California resident. The court rejected the application 
of Mexico's limitation on damages, finding that the underlying 
policy of protecting defendants from the imposition of excessive 
financial burdens was inapplicable since the defendant was a 
California resident. The court found an interest in applying its 
own law, reasoning that the purpose of the law, which imposed 
79. Id. at 555, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 556, 432 P.2d at 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 35. 
82. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313,319, 546 P.2d 719, 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. 
215, 218, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 159 (1976). 
83. 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974). 
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no limitations on recovery for wrongful death, was to strengthen 
the deterrent aspect of the law creating an action for wrongful 
death. California was found to have a definite interest in deter- 
ring harmful conduct within its borderd4 
Reich and Hurtado established a pattern for the resolution 
of conflicts of law problems utilizing the governmental interest 
approach: (1) identify the involved states, (2) ascertain their 
respective laws, (3) identify the policies and state interests under- 
lying the laws, and (4) determine if each state has an interest in 
applying its own law. This analysis was carried no further, how- 
ever, since in both cases the court found that only one state had 
an interest in applying its law. Thus, neither Reich nor Hurtado 
gave any concrete indication as to how the court would deal with 
a true conflict. 
In the instant case, the California Supreme Court followed 
the pattern established in Reich and Hurtado, first identifying 
the "involved states" as Nevada and California and then analyz- 
ing their respective laws and underlying policies. The court noted 
that, in the case of Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, I ~ C . , ~ ~  the 
Nevada Supreme Court had refused to impose civil liability 
upon tavern owners, the stated policy being that to do so would 
"subject the tavern owner to ruinous exposure every time he 
poured a drink and would multiply litigation endlessly [need- 
lessly] in a claims[s] -conscious society. California, however, 
seeking to enforce a policy that would "[protect] members- of 
the general public from injuries . . . resulting from the excessive 
use of intoxicating liquor,"" had judicially imposed civil liability 
on a tavern owner in the 1971 decision of Vesely v. Sager? The 
court concluded that both states had an interest in the case and 
that it was confronted with a true conflict rather than a false 
conflict as in the previous cases of Reich and hurt ad^.^^ 
Faced with a true conflict, the court, under traditional inter- 
- -- - 
84. Id. at 583-84, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112. 
85. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969). 
86. 16 Cal. 3d at 318,546 P.2d at 722,128 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (quoting Hamm v. Carson 
City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 101, 450 P.2d 358, 359 (1969)). 
87. 16 Cal. 3d at 318,546 P.2d at 722,128 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (quoting Vesely v. Sager, 
5 Cal. 3d 153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971)). 
88. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). 
89. 16 Cal. 3d at 319, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
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est analysis, could have simply applied the law of the forum.go 
However, the court apparently chose to treat this as an avoidable 
conflictg1 and attempted to resolve the issue through a moderate 
and restrained interpretation of the applicable laws. To imple- 
ment this process the court adopted the "comparative impair- 
ment" concept advocated by Professor Baxterg2 and attempted to 
determine "which state's interest would be more impaired if its 
policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state."g3 
The court had identified Nevada's policy as being designed 
to limit the liability of its tavern owners and the California policy 
as being to protect its citizens from injury resulting from the use 
of intoxicating liquor. Analyzing these policies in light of the facts 
presented by the case, the court reasoned that the defendant, by 
advertising and soliciting business in California, had "put itself 
a t  the heart of California's regulatory in t e r e~ t . "~~  Therefore, its 
activities fell within the scope of the California law and Califor- 
nia's interest would be substantially impaired if California law 
were not applied. 
The court minimized the impact of the decision on Nevada's 
interest, stating that since Nevada already subjects its tavern 
owners to criminal liability, the decision would not impose an 
entirely new duty upon the tavern owners to distinguish between 
California residents and other patrons but would simply increase 
their economic exposure to include a foreseeable and coverable 
business expense. Further, since liability would extend only to 
those tavern owners who advertise in California, Nevada's policy 
would not be significantly impaired? The court concluded that 
on balance the California policy would be more impaired if Cali- 
fornia law were not applied and, therefore, reversed the trial 
court's decision to sustain the demurrer. 
The validity of the court's use of the governmental interest 
approach depends largely upon the accuracy of its identification 
of the interests and policies underlying the conflicting state laws. 
The case note will analyze the court's identification of the various 
state interests and policies, discuss the application of the compar- 
90. See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
91. Avoidable conflicts are discussed in the text accompanying note 70 supra. 
92. Comparative impairment is discussed in the text accompanying note 63 supra. 
93. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
94. Id, at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. 
95. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. 
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ative impairment test after fully identifying the state interests, 
and review the alternatives available to a court when no decision 
can be reached through state interest analysis. 
A. Identifying the Underlying State Interests 
The court identified the California policy as protecting the 
public from injuries resulting from the excessive use of liquor.g6 
This policy is furthered by imposing criminal and civil liability, 
both of which seek to deter tavern owners from selling alcoholic 
beverages to obviously intoxicated persons who are likely to cause 
injury in California. The court specifically identified this policy 
of prevention and labeled it a "regulatory intere~t."~' 
Prevention of injury, however, is not the only interest under- 
lying California's policy. Once an injury has occurred, the state 
has an interest in compensating the injured. Although the court 
did not mention this compensatory interest, the imposition of 
civil liability appears to have a compensatory as well as a regula- 
tory function, since it allows third parties to look to the tavern 
owners for recovery for injuries sustained in accidents with intoxi- 
cated tavern patrons. 
Although the court initially identified Nevada's policy as 
protection of Nevada's tavern owners from unrestricted civil lia- 
b i l i t ~ , ~ ~  the court also referred several times to a supposed Ne- 
vada statute imposing criminal liability? The court apparently 
assumed that although Nevada had not imposed civil liability, it 
had a regulatory interest in preventing tavern owners from serv- 
ing liquor to already intoxicated patrons. 
The criminal statute, however, had been repealed in 1973.1°0 
96. Id. at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
97. Id. at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. 
98. Id. at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
99. Id. at 322-23, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. a t  221: 
Although the State of Nevada does not impose such civil liability on its 
tavern keepers, nevertheless they are subject to criminal penalties under a stat- 
ute making it unlawful to sell or give intoxicating liquor to any person who is 
drunk or known to be an habitual drunkard. (See Nev. Rev. Stats. 202.100 
. . . .) 
. . . .  
Since the act of selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated persons 
is already proscribed in Nevada, the application of California's rule of civil 
liability would not impose an entirely new duty requiring the ability to distin- 
guish between California residents and other patrons. 
100. 1973 Nev. Stats. 1059. The statute in effect when Hamm u. Carson City Nugget, 
Inc. was decided was NEV. REX. STAT. 5 202.100 (repealed 1973). 
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This legislative action,lol combined with the Nevada Supreme 
Court's decision in Hamm v. Carson City Nuggett, Inc.lo2 not to 
impose civil liability on a tavern owner, indicates that, contrary 
to the court's supposition, Nevada has a strong policy against 
regulating its tavern owners in this area. 
Although a policy of nonregulation seems somewhat unusual 
a t  first glance, upon examination i t  .is not irrational. Nevada's 
economy is based in large part upon its gambling and entertain- 
ment industries, both of which involve high-volume sales of alco- 
holic beverages. Thus it would seem that Nevada's policy is most 
likely designed to protect its economic interests in these indus- 
tries. 
In addition to the probable economic interest, it would seem 
that Nevada has a special interest in being free from regulation 
by other states. Since states are generally empowered to establish 
the rights and duties of their citizens in those areas that are free 
from federal regulation, it might be said that all states have an 
interest in being free from the regulation of other states. This 
interest would be particularly strong if, as in the instant case, i t  
could be said that a state has determined that i t  will not regulate 
an activity that is normally regulated.lo3 
B. Reapplication of the Comparative Impairment Test 
Having identified the policies and, to a limited extent, the 
underlying motivational interests, the court attempted to resolve 
the conflict by determining which state's interest would be most 
impaired if its law were not applied. The court's decision to apply 
California law is not unacceptable if one agrees that the court 
correctly identified the underlying policies and interests.lo4 How- 
101. "A subsequent change in legislation can, although it does not necessarily do so, 
define the strength of a policy at the time a transaction took place." A. VON MEHREN & 
D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 376 (1965). 
102. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969). 
103. It might be said in light of the repeal of the criminal statute that Nevada has 
extended a privilege to protect the tavern owners from liability that would ordinarily be 
imposed. Comment a to § 163 of Restatement (Second) suggests that if the state of 
conduct has established a privilege protecting certain behavior that is normally tortious 
in the state of injury, a court should respect that privilege and apply the law of the state 
of conduct if the policy underlying the rule of nonliability is a strong one. 
104. If Nevada's criminal statute were still in effect, it could be assumed that both 
Nevada and California would have an interest in preventing injuries and that the imposi- 
tion of civil liability by California is simply strengthening a preexisting Nevada policy. 
Although Nevada would still have an interest in being free from out-of-state regulation, 
it seems less offensive to impose California law when Nevada's policy differs only in degree 
and not in'substance from California's. 
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ever, as indicated in the previous section, the court made an 
incorrect assumption as to Nevada law and thus did not fully 
consider Nevada's interests in the case; also, the court did not 
discuss California's compensatory interest. This section will ana- 
lyze the application of comparative impairment as if the court 
had fully and correctly identified the state interests involved. 
I .  The possible impairment of California's interests 
The court correctly stated that California has an interest in 
preventing the service of liquor to intoxicated customers when- 
ever it will produce harmful effects in California. It is less clear 
that California is justified in attempting to protect this interest 
by imposing regulations upon conduct occurring out of state. 
The California Supreme Court previously stated in Reich v. 
Purcell that the foreign state within which injury occurred was 
"concerned with conduct within her borders and as to such con- 
duct she has the predominant interest of the states involved."105 
Likewise, in Hurtado v. Superior Court, the court justified the 
application of California law on the ground that California had 
an interest in deterring harmful conduct within its borders.lOWn 
the basis of the court's previous statements, i t  would appear that 
i t  would respect Nevada's predominate interest in regulating or 
refusing to regulate such conduct within its borders.lo7 However, 
the fact that a defendant's conduct in another state will possibly 
cause harmful effects in California seems to place him within the 
ambit of California's interest in prevention of injury.lo8 Thus, 
105. 67 Cal. 2d at 556, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. a t  34. 
106. 11 Cal. 3d at 584, 522 P.2d at 672, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 112. 
107. Id. Compare id. with Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 
284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (1963): 
It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different from 
what it would have been had the issue related to the manner in which the 
defendant had been driving his car a t  the time of the accident. Where the 
defendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, 
the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually 
have a predominant, if not exclusive concern. 
108. The United States Supreme Court has stated that: 
A person who sets in motion in one State the means by which injury is inflicted 
in another may, consistently with the due process clause, be made liable for that 
injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an irresponsible 
instrument. The cases are many in which a person acting outside the State may 
be held responsible according to the law of the State for injurious consequences 
within it. 
Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59 (1932). But see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 US.  809, 
824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of 
9531 CASE NOTES 971 
even though it is somewhat inconsistent with the court's prior 
statements, it seems that the court is justified in its conclusion 
in the instant case that this prevention interest would be im- 
paired by the nonapplication of California law. 
The extent to which California's compensatory interest 
would be impaired by the application of Nevada law is less clear. 
If California law is not applied, the plaintiff cannot recover from 
the tavern owner and will be forced to recover from the California 
driver. Since there is no policy allowing the plaintiff double recov- 
ery for his injuries, the compensatory interest will be impaired 
only to the extent that the plaintiffs injuries exceed his recovery 
from the driver. Thus the effect on California's compensatory 
interest is uncertain, and may vary greatly from case to case, a 
conclusion that may explain why the court did not discuss this 
aspect of California's law. 
2. The possible impairment of Nevada's interests 
The impairment to Nevada's economic interest is apparent, 
since part of the tavern owners' revenues will be used to pay for 
either California judgments or liability insurance, thus decreas- 
ing the funds available in Nevada for taxes, investment, and 
salaries. It is also conceivable that the imposition of liability 
would cause tavern owners to avoid further solicitation in Califor- 
nia, thus actually decreasing revenues and economic growth. This 
reduction would probably occur, however, only if the cost of the 
judgments or liability insurance exceeded the profits derived 
from sales to California customers, a development that seems 
unlikely. 
The impairment to Nevada's interest is limited somewhat by 
the fact that only those tavern owners who advertise in California 
will be subject to liability. The risk of economic impairment is 
increased, however, by the fact that plaintiffs in this particular 
tort can choose defendants. This presents the possibility that the 
tavern owner will often be the sole defendant, the plaintiff having 
elected to bypass the drunken driver. The application of Califor- 
nia law will thus have the occasional effect of substituting a Ne- 
vada defendant for a California defendant, shifting the entire 
economic loss from California to Nevada. 
A more serious impairment to Nevada's interest arises from 
another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected 
when they travel to that State."). 
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the imposition of regulation by California in an area wherein 
Nevada has a strong policy against regulation. Nevada, exercising 
its sovereign right to determine the rights and duties of its citi- 
zens, has decided that its tavern owners have no duty to avoid 
selling liquor to already intoxicated patrons. The application of 
California law requires that the tavern owners assume a new duty 
of not only refusing to serve alcohol to already inebriated Califor- 
nians, but also first identifying the California customers, a task 
that may be difficult and out of place in the setting in which the 
tort normally occurs. The imposition of a new standard of con- 
duct is a more substantial imposition upon Nevada's sovereign 
rights than simply extending civil liability to enforce an already 
existing duty (which was what the Bernhard court thought i t  was 
doing) or removing the dollar limitations on recovery (as in Reich 
and Hurtado). 
3. Comparative impairment 
Having examined in detail the impact of the nonapplication 
of either state's law upon the respective state interests involved, 
i t  appears that the resolution of the issue in the instant case on 
the basis of comparative impairment is very difficult. The Cali- 
fornia policy of regulation is in direct conflict with Nevada's pol- 
icy of nonregulation, the advancement of either resulting in a 
corresponding detriment to the other. Further, without additional 
information, it is difficult to compare the economic impairment 
to Nevada with the possible impairment to California's compen- 
satory policy. In short, an analysis of the state interests using 
comparative impairment is inconclusive as to which law should 
be applied. 
It appears that had the court identified all the relevant state 
policies and interests, it would have recognized that i t  faced an 
unavoidable rather than an avoidable conflict. Traditional gov- 
ernmental interest required that the court apply the law of the 
forum when faced with an unavoidable conflict;log however, this 
is only one of the possible solutions. The following section pres- 
ents a brief analysis of this and other alternatives that might be 
adopted to resolve an unavoidable conflict. 
C. Possible Solutions to an  Unavoidable Conflict 
1. Apply forum law 
Application of forum law is the traditional solution recom- 
109. See text accompanying note 61 supra. 
9531 CASE NOTES 973 
mended by Professor Currie. It has the advantage of being simple 
in application and also insures that the forum's interests will 
always be protected. In some cases, however, application of forum 
law will be grossly unfair to the defendant, since he will not have 
foreseen its application. Furthermore, most commentators be- 
lieve that the courts should employ more sophisticated reasoning, 
rather than mechanically applying forum law. 
2. Consider factors other than state interests 
Another alternative, recommended by Professor H o r o ~ i t z , ~ ~ ~  
is that the court enlarge the number of factors considered in 
making the decision to include an analysis of applicable multi- 
state policies and the relevant interests of the parties. The fact 
that the court in the instant case indirectly considered the expec- 
tations of the defendant would lend some credence to this 
s~ggestion.~~' Professor Horowitz also points out that the opinions 
in Reich, Bernkrant v. Fowler, and People v. One 1953 Ford 
Victoria referred to one or both of these factors.lI2 
It  seems, however, that if the court is going to consider 
factors other than the relevant state interests, it should do so 
expressly, rather than relying indirectly upon these factors as 
secondary support for a questionable decision supposedly based 
solely upon state interest analysis. Even though it may make no 
difference in the outcome whether the decision is expressly or 
impliedly based upon other factors, it would seem that if the 
court is going to base its decision upon something other than the 
rule it is ostensibly applying, it should do so openly rather than 
by attempting to distort the rule itself in order to reach the de- 
sired result.Il3 
3. Adopt another method 
An alternative method would be to completely abandon the 
110. Horowitz' suggestions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 65-68 supra. 
111. The court referred to the imposition of civil liability as a "foreseeable and 
coverable business expense." 16 Cal. 3d at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221. In 
light of the fact that the defendant advertised in California, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the club could foresee the occurrence of an accident similar to the one that occurred 
and the subsequent imposition of California law. This appears to be a more reasonable 
basis for the decision than the state interest analysis. 
112. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 772-79. These cases are discussed in text accompany- 
ing notes 73-82 supra. 
113. This was a common criticism of the first Restatement. See text accompanying 
notes 3-11 supm. 
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emphasis upon an analysis of governmental interests and look to 
other approaches, such as those discussed above. l4 Interestingly, 
to the extent the court adopts Professor Horowitz' suggestion and 
bases its decision upon factors other than state interests, the 
governmental interest approach loses its distinctive characteris- 
tics and begins to closely resemble other conflicts of laws theories. 
If the governmental interest approach includes, in addition to a 
state interest analysis, a consideration of the multistate policies 
and the relevant interests of the parties, it can scarcely be distin- 
guished from Leflar's choice-influencing considerations discussed 
above.l15 It might be said that the primary difference between 
expanded governmental interest and the choice-influencing con- 
siderations is that in the former the state interest analysis pre- 
dominates while in the latter there is no particular emphasis upon 
any one factor and the court is free to base its decision upon the 
element that it considers most relevant in the particular case. 
The same resemblance can be drawn between expanded govern- 
mental interest and the broad approach permissible under sec- 
tion 6 of the Restatement (Second), 116 which includes as relevant 
factors "the needs of the interstate and international systems," 
"the relevant policies of the forum," "the relevant policies of 
other interested states," and "the protection of justified expecta- 
tions." The broadened governmental interest approach is also 
similar in some respects to Ehrenzweig's model. l7 Horowitz ex- 
pressly mentions Ehrenzweig's "rule of validation" as one of the 
applicable multistate policies to be considered,l18 and the similar- 
ity between Ehrenzweig's "foreseeable and insurable law" theory 
and Horowitz' "relevant interests of the parties" seems evident.l19 
The governmental interest approach seems most foreign to 
Cavers' principles of preference120 and the rules of the Restate- 
114. The alternatives are discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-48 supra. 
115. The choice-influencing considerations are discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 22-33 supra. 
116. The Restatement (Second) is discussed in the text accompanying notes 15-21 
supra. 
117. Ehrenzweig's approach is discussed in the text accompanying notes 37-48 supra. 
118. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 759. 
119. One of the elements of the factor entitled "relevant interests of the parties" is 
called "prevention of unfair surprise." This element corresponds to Ehrenzweig's 
"foreseeable and insurable law" maxim. Both phrases refer to the basic idea that no party 
should be subjected to a law whose application he could not foresee. Compare Horowitz, 
supra note 57 a t  776-79 with Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of 
Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 
II, 69 YALE L.J. 794, 801 (1960). 
120. The principles of preference are discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-36 
supra. 
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ment (Second). However, it may be that as more cases are de- 
cided utilizing governmental interest such rules and principles 
may emerge. Horowitz himself states that "Professor Cavers' . . . 
'principles of preference' will surely be the form which the choice- 
of-law rules of the future will take."1210f all the alternatives, the 
instant case indicates that California is most likely to follow 
Horowitz' suggestion-first attempting to resolve the conflict 
through an analysis of the state interests and, if no decision can 
be reached, going on to consider a limited number of additional 
factors. However, an important point to be derived from the in- 
stant case is that perhaps the court should be more willing to 
admit that the state interests are sometimes in balance. If a t  that 
point the court is going to broaden its analysis to include other 
relevant factors, it should do so expressly rather than by implica- 
tion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the instant case that there are certain prere- 
quisites to the successful application of the governmental interest 
approach. First, it is imperative that the court be accurately in- 
formed as to the applicable laws. Second, the court must be thor- 
ough and honest in its attempt to ascertain the underlying state 
interests; simply accepting a policy stated in a reported court 
opinion is inadequate and leaves the court open to criticism.122 
Finally, in the cases that present true conflicts, the court must 
be objective and realistic in its attempt to sucresfully accommo- 
date the conflicting state interests. 
If the court's analysis meets the above criteria, governmental 
interest will yield a satisfactory result in many cases. It seems 
particularly useful in the false conflict cases such as Reich, and 
can also be successfully employed in certain true conflict cases 
such as People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,123 wherein the state 
121. Horowitz, supra note 57, at 780 (footnote omitted). 
122. Professor Leflar has commented upon this problem: 
True governmental interests of a state are not discoverable by blind matching 
with any old law that may be on the state's books. They can be identified, and 
in turn implemented, only by thoughtful and intelligent analysis of the legal 
materials in the light of current socio-economic, cultural, and political attitudes 
in the community. Ascertainment of a state's governmental interests is no small 
task, not one to be solved by locating a statutory section or a paragraph in an 
old judicial opinion. 
Leflar, supra note 22, a t  291. 
123. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). 
976 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
interests can be accommodated by application of the comparative 
impairment concept. 
The instant case also brings into sharp focus the question of 
how the court should react when no decision can be reached 
through an analysis of the state interests. In these cases, the court 
should look beyond the confines of state interest analysis for the 
solution, preferably to include an analysis of additional factors 
such as those recommended by Horowitz. In so doing, however, 
the court should be willing to acknowledge that these factors are 
being considered and should expressly identify them in the deci- 
sion. 
